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Abstract 
The Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons was established in 1997, and, 
not surprisingly, was charged with the task of modernising the House of Commons. The Leader 
of the House, also a cabinet minister, has chaired this Committee since its creation. The nature of 
the reforms pursued by the Committee has frequently provoked criticism from the House. This 
paper will examine the ways in which the unusual chairmanship of the Committee has helped to 
facilitate this partisan response to the work of the Committee. It will focus on Modernisation 
Committee reforms to legislative programming, House sitting hours, and time-limited speeches in 
order to illustrate the case. The paper will draw on Hansard debates, Modernisation Committee 
reports, and interviews conducted by the author. 
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Introduction 
The Labour Party in opposition before the May 1997 general election committed itself to a broad 
programme of constitutional reform. Part of that programme included the modernisation of the 
House of Commons, and a Modernisation select committee was duly appointed in order to 
engage with the task. Since its creation, the Leader of the House of Commons has chaired this 
Committee. It is, to say the least, highly unusual for a cabinet minister to chair a Commons select 
committee, and this make-up of the Modernisation Committee has helped facilitate a partisan 
response to many of its reform proposals.  
These partisan responses highlight the contested aims of parliamentary reform and the 
nature of the reform agenda pursued by the Committee. This controversy stems from the 
distinction between reforms designed to make the House of Commons more efficient, and 
reforms designed to make the House of Commons more effective. It must be stated, however, that 
the relationship between these two concepts is not zero-sum: efficiency reforms may contribute 
towards a more effective Commons, and vice versa. There is, however, a distinction to be made 
between the two terms, which helps categorise the various recommendations made by the 
Modernisation Committee since 1997. At the most general level, efficiency reforms are those that 
contribute towards the government achieving its business more speedily, while effectiveness 
reforms are those that contribute towards the ability of the Commons to hold the government to 
account and scrutinise its actions.  
Kelso (2003) has outlined the various difficulties associated with securing effectiveness 
reforms in the political context in which the House of Commons operates. This political context 
is the result of the historical development of the Westminster political system (e.g. Amery 1952; 
Butt 1964; Evans 1985; Garrard 2002; Harling 2001; Hill 1985; Pugh 2002; Rush 1981, 2001). 
These difficulties stem from the reaction against such reforms from those actors who would be 
disadvantaged by them, those actors generally constituting the dominant elite inside the 
Commons. This analysis draws on ‘attitudinal’ (Crick (1964)1968, Norton 2000b) and 
‘contextual’ (Judge 1993; Beattie 1995; Flinders 2002) approaches to account for the success or 
failure of parliamentary reform. The ‘contextual’ approach is drawn from historical institutional 
theory, its ideas on path dependency and the role of structured institutional contexts in explaining 
the persistence of institutions and patterns of behaviour therein (Thelen & Steinmo 1992; Pierson 
1996, 2000; Hay & Wincott 1998). The notion of a dominant elite should not be construed as 
inflicting labels of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ on particular groups inside the Commons. As Riddell (2000:7) 
has noted, classifying parties and whips as ‘the enemy’ of an effective parliament is naïve. 
Instead, these groups are described as dominant elites because this most accurately reflects the 
role they play in supporting and advancing the goals of the most powerful actor at Westminster - 
government. 
Reforms designed to secure enhanced efficiency have tended to provoke a different kind of 
reaction. Efficiency reforms are very much in keeping with the behaviour expected from the 
dominant elite at Westminster. Governments are, of course, interested in parliament as a forum 
through which they achieve their business. The current government is by no means unique in its 
desire to achieve that business as expeditiously as possible (Norton 2001a:51). House procedure 
is a powerful political weapon that reflects the structures inside the Commons, and governments 
are interested in securing procedures that are efficient in dispatching with their business (Redlich 
1980, Walkland 1976). Although procedure can also act to constrain government (Norton 2001b), 
efficiency reforms primarily benefit government, and may be opposed and criticised by 
oppositions, and also by backbenchers anxious to defend their position. This paper will therefore 
examine some of the efficiency reforms pursued by the Modernisation Committee since its 
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establishment in 1997, with the aim of illustrating the nature of the criticism expressed, as well as 
the nature of the support attracted. In particular, it will examine how these criticisms have been 
due in part to the nature of the Modernisation Committee, and its being chaired by a cabinet 
minister. Evidence is found by examining Modernisation Committee reports and House of 
Commons debates on these matters. In addition, the paper will draw on a series of elite semi-
structured interviews conducted by the author between spring 2002 and spring 2003 with key 
actors engaged in various aspects of parliamentary reform, from Modernisation Committee 
members to all-party parliamentary groups.  
This paper forms only part of a wider research project that is still to be concluded. This 
narrow topic, focusing on the role of the Leader of the House and the response this role has 
provoked, is geared towards making a useful contribution to the ‘Parties in Parliament’ panel. It 
does not, therefore, explore in great depth the theoretical underpinnings of the research.  
 
The Modernisation Committee and the Leader of the House 
The House of Commons held a debate on modernisation, and the proposed new select committee 
to deal with it, on 22 May 1997. The debate was opened by the new Leader of the House, Ann 
Taylor, who referred to the ‘dangers of Governments and Oppositions adopting rigid roles’, and 
of the need to ensure reform proposals were approved speedily (HC Debs., 22 May 1997, 
vol.294, cols.902-3). Taylor further noted that the desire to see Commons reform was shared on 
both sides of the House, and that ‘[t]here is a wish to take the opportunity that is now available to 
us’ (col.903). The new Modernisation Committee would be charged with examining 
improvements to the legislative process, accountability issues, the pattern of Members’ working 
life, and the customs and practices of Parliament (cols.903-9). Taylor concluded that the level of 
interest expressed in the House during the debate was ‘the best sign that we have had in many 
years that there is a serious intention to modernise this place, and I hope that we do not miss this 
window of opportunity’ (col.909). Several Members noted the need to proceed on a non-partisan 
basis, with Sir Peter Emery, for example, arguing that ‘[m]any hon. Members want to play a 
political game, but many of us are honestly interested in trying to improve the way that 
Parliament operates’ (col.917). Clive Soley declared that ‘[t]his Parliament has a wonderful 
opportunity radically to reform the House of Commons’ (col.938). 
For some, however, an important problem was evident in the new arrangements. Concerns 
about the way in which the reform process would be handled were highlighted by Sir Patrick 
Cormack, who referred to ‘the essential dichotomy’ at the heart of the reform debate. This 
dichotomy lay in the dual role of the Leader of the House, who ‘in her capacity as a leading 
Member of the Government, is understandably anxious to get government business through … 
but to get business through and to have it properly scrutinised … is a problem’ (HC Debs., 22 
May 1997, vol.294, col.936). In the debate of 4 June 1997, which established the Modernisation 
Committee, further such concerns were heard. Alistair Goodlad, Shadow Leader of the House, for 
example, argued that, in the time since the initial debate on modernisation on 22 May 1997, it had 
become clear that ‘to the Government, modernisation may mean changes to the House’s 
procedures in the interests of government’ (HC Debs., 4 June 1997, vol.295, col.500). Goodlad 
expressed his hope that ‘the Leader of the House will not succumb to any temptation or further 
pressure from her ministerial colleagues to use the new Committee as a means for the 
Government to entrench the abuses of their large majority’ (col.501).  
The terms of reference of the Modernisation Committee, approved on 4 June 1997, do not 
stipulate that the Leader of the House must be in the chair. Indeed, the terms of reference of none 
of the select committees indicates who will be chairman, as this is a matter voted upon by the 
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committee. When it was established, however, the Committee membership list, approved by the 
House of Commons, included both the Leader and Shadow Leader of the House. This 
arrangement was likely agreed through the usual channels, with the in-built government majority 
ensuring the election of the Leader of the House to the chair in the event that other members took 
issue with the situation. The inclusion of the Leader and Shadow Leaders has at some point, 
however, broken down. During his time as Shadow Leader, Eric Forth did not sit on the 
Committee, although the situation has seemingly rectified itself with the inclusion of current 
Shadow Leader Oliver Heald on the membership list. 
Labour Modernisation Committee members, when interviewed in early summer 2002, 
supported the Leader of the House as chair of the Modernisation Committee, which is not 
particularly surprising (interviews, 13 May 2002, 15 May 2002, 22 May 2002). Liberal Democrat 
members have also been supportive. Both Members on the Committee, Andrew Stunnell and 
Paul Tyler, have been there since 1997, demonstrating a remarkable stability in membership and 
a firm commitment to modernisation. Both Stunnell and Tyler, during interview, expressed 
general support for the Committee being chaired by the Leader of the House (interviews, 23 April 
2002). While both accepted the chairmanship had been controversial, neither shared that view, 
and argued that reform had to have the compliance of government in order to proceed, and the 
Leader of the House was therefore performing a valuable role. Neither of these members 
commented on the role the Leader of the House may play in securing efficiency reforms in the 
interests of government. Of course, the Modernisation Committee was partly the result of the 
Cook-McClennan agreement reached prior to the 1997 general election (interview, 23 April 
2002). It may be ventured, therefore, that the Liberal Democrats feel they have a vested interest 
in ensuring the success of the modernisation project in general, despite some of the apparent 
drawbacks. Conservatives, both on the Modernisation Committee and on the Commons’ benches, 
have been much more critical of the role of the Leader of the House. Conservative Nicholas 
Winterton has been the most willing of his colleagues to engage with the work of the Committee. 
He has not, as shall be seen, participated in the dissenting reports produced by other 
Conservatives on the Committee, and has spoken highly of Robin Cook during his time in the 
Committee chair. In principle, however, he has been critical of the role of Leader of the House in 
the Modernisation Committee, because: 
 
[i]t would be clearly understood that if the Committee produces a report it has the 
blessing of the government, and the blessing of the government may not be in the 
interests of the House of Commons, because any government is keen to have a 
system whereby it can get its business as quickly and as easily as possible. (interview, 
23 May 2002) 
 
As the rest of the paper will demonstrate, the dual role of Leader of the House as chairman of the 
Modernisation Committee has helped facilitate a partisan response to the Committee’s 
recommendations, primarily from the Conservative Party. However, there has also been some 
determined opposition from amongst Labour’s own backbenches, demonstrating, in line with 
King (1976), that the relationships in the House are not just between government and opposition, 
but also between government and its own backbenches. 
 
Efficiency in the House of Commons 
Although the Modernisation Committee pledged to examine a wide range of issues with regards 
to the operation of the House of Commons, it is in the area of improving the efficiency of the 
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Commons that most attention has been spent. Three particular issues will be examined here: 
legislative programming, sitting hours of the Commons, and time-limiting speeches.  
 
Legislative programming 
Of all the efficiency reforms proposed by the Modernisation Committee, perhaps none provoked 
more criticism of the Committee and its central purposes than did its proposals on legislative 
programming. This is a mechanism falling between the guillotine and voluntary timetabling, both 
of which had of course long been in use (Palmer 1970, Redlich 1908). The concept of legislative 
programming is far from new. In recent times, it had been examined by the Procedure Committee 
(HC 49, 1984-1985; HC 324, 1985-1986), had been supported by the Jopling Committee on 
Sittings of the House (HC 20, 1991-1992), and received support from the Hansard Society 
Commission on the legislative process (Hansard Society 1993). The Conservative Party’s 
Commission to Strengthen Parliament has also supported the idea in principle (Norton 2000a).  
The Labour government, undoubtedly keen to secure its business as speedily as possible 
after two decades in opposition, set the Modernisation Committee to work on reform of the 
legislative process, and encouraged prompt action. The Committee published a report on this 
issue barely three months after the general election (HC 190, 1997-98). The Report stipulated that 
the first essential criteria to be met in making any reforms was that the government had to be 
assured of having its business passed, with Commons approval (HC 190, para.14). The 
Committee admitted that the issue was ‘emotive and contentious’ (para.57) and that there would 
always be ‘political considerations’ involved in the handling of bills (para.58). However, the 
report maintained that programming could be beneficial for all those involved in the legislative 
process, and that a way could be found between the informal usual channels and the more rigid 
guillotine. The principle of programming did find support in the House when it was debated on 
13 November 1997. Shadow Leader of the House Gillian Shepherd, for example, expressing her 
support for programming in general, noted the difficulties in finding a balance between the 
competing claims of government, opposition and backbenchers (HC Debs., vol.300, col.1071,). 
During interview, in spring 2002, one Labour member of the Modernisation Committee 
explained that programming was just a first step in reforming the legislative cycle away from 
being based on sessions towards being based around the entire length of a parliament (interview, 
18 April 2002). This MP was clear that such moves did not ‘strengthen the executive’ in the 
slightest (interview, 18 April 2002). Other backbenchers have been less supportive, with 
Gwyneth Dunwoody in particular expressing her objections. She described the ability of 
backbenchers to hold up legislation as ‘one of their last remaining powers and … those who talk 
about timetabling Bills do Backbenchers … a great disservice’ (HC Debs., 9 March 1998, 
vol.308, col.16).  
In July 2000, the Committee returned once more to legislative programming (HC 589, 
1999-2001), in light of emerging difficulties in securing programming motions, and defended it 
on a number of grounds. First, it allows the government to know when its legislation will be 
approved. In addition, it allows the opposition an insight into the structure and focus of debate. 
Programming also affords all backbenchers more certainty of voting times. Finally, it results in 
better legislation because fewer government amendments will be tabled at the last minute 
(para.13). The Committee’s recommendation for developing legislative programming was to use 
sessional orders as a means to implement a more formal structure on the process (paras.22-42). 
This report was not, however, unanimous. Senior Conservative Committee member, Sir George 
Young, included a dissenting report, which complained that the programming motions proposals 
‘make it yet easier for Government to get its legislative programme through the House and, in so 
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doing, lessen rather than encourage proper and adequate scrutiny’ (para.4). It also argued that 
there would not be the need for programming if government did not insist on pressing so much 
legislation through parliament (paras.11-13). The dissenting report argued for the return to 
voluntary timetabling between the usual channels that had operated prior to the Modernisation 
Committee changes (para.30-32).  
The controversy over the extension of programming motions intensified during the debate 
on the Report on 7th November 2000. Over two hours were initially spent debating a business 
motion put forward by the government to limit the length of the debate and force a vote at 
10.00pm. Eric Forth declared that ‘the Government, in the guise of the Modernisation Committee 
– for this purpose the two are identical – have decided to assault the House of Commons’ (HC 
Debs., 7 November 2000, vol.356 col.173). Gwyneth Dunwoody added that ‘it is always wise for 
Back Bench members to beware of motions proposed by Front Benchers who argue that the 
proposals in the motion are for the convenience of Back Benchers’ (col.175). Michael Fallon 
stated that ‘it is particularly deplorable and appalling for debate on a motion that will curtail our 
rights to be curtailed’ (col.176). Sir Peter Emery highlighted the marginalisation of the 
Modernisation Committee in the process of constructing the motion for the debate, when he 
declared that the Committee had not seen or discussed the matter on the Order Paper, insinuating 
that the government had proceeded to present its own programming proposals without reference 
to the Committee (col.177). Nicholas Winterton described the handling of the question of 
programming motions as ‘totally unacceptable’ (col.192). He described the business motion as 
‘the guillotine of guillotines’, and noted his concern over the proposals in that, if implemented, 
‘Back Benchers will have less opportunity to do what they are here to do’ (col.192-3). The 
business motion was, of course, passed, but all Conservative and Liberal Democrat members of 
the Modernisation Committee voted against it, while the Labour members (save two who were 
absent) voted for the motion.  
When the debate proper got under way, the controversy continued. Conservative 
Committee member John Bercow stated: 
 
Is the meagre fare proposed by the Modernisation Committee any surprise, given that 
the Committee is chaired by a member of the Cabinet, and contains no fewer than 
three parliamentary private secretaries to Ministers, who are, of course, members of 
the Government payroll vote? The fingerprints of the Government Whips Office are 
all over the Committee. (col.228) 
 
Sir George Young, by then a former Modernisation Committee member, argued that the 
legislative programming recommendations would result in a weakened House of Commons 
because ‘the Opposition do not have many weapons, and the Report invites us to put some of 
them beyond use, while the Government sit on their substantial arsenal’ (col.255).  The role of 
government in the matter was also castigated by Eric Forth, who observed, ‘the massed ranks of 
Government Members coming into the House to vote these measures through, when the only 
beneficiary can be the Government’ (col.252). The vote on the government motion to introduce 
programming was supported on division by 296 votes to 137. Unlike with the preceding business 
motion, the Liberal Democrat members of the Modernisation Committee voted with the Labour 
members, while the Conservative members voted against. The debate was later described by one 
MP as emphatically not about scrutiny and more ‘like moving deck chairs on the deck of an oil 
tanker and suggesting that that would somehow make it change course’ (HC Debs., 9th November 
2000, vol.356, col.502).  
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The Committee again returned to programming in April 2001 (HC 382, 2000-2001), and 
noted that cross-party agreement had not been reached on the sessional orders, and that every 
programme motion had consequently faced opposition (para.3). The Committee proposed a 
number of changes to how programming should work, if it was to be approved for further use 
(paras.4-6). This report was once more accompanied by a dissenting report, attached by 
Conservatives Angela Browning and Richard Shepherd. This categorically denied that legislative 
programming had improved the ‘terms of trade’ for everyone: 
 
It is clearly to the disadvantage of the Official Opposition, to the expressed 
disadvantage of backbenchers and minorities and to the balance between the majority 
and the minority within the House. It has strengthened the Government’s control over 
procedures with no discernible concession to the Opposition. It is true that the 
Government will get greater certainty for this legislative timetable. The proposition 
that Opposition parties and backbenchers will get greater opportunities to debate and 
vote on the issues of most concern to them simply has not been borne out by 
experience in this Session of the experiment … (HC 382, appendix). 
 
Robin Cook, while Leader of the House, attempted to apply the balm of diplomacy to the 
programming controversy in the Modernisation Committee’s 2002 reform package (HC 1168, 
2001-2002). That Report noted that ‘since its introduction, programming has moved from a 
procedure for which there was broad agreement, to a process secured on a majority vote’ 
(para.47). The Report reiterated that ‘the strategic objective must be to find a consensual way of 
securing agreement to the timetabling of Bills’ and that finding such a consensus ‘depends on all 
sides recognising that they each have more to gain from agreement than by confrontation’ 
(para.48). The Report sought to find middle ground on the issue, and recommended that the 
acceptance of changes elsewhere in the legislative process should allow for more flexibility in 
programming motions, and that, if the government demonstrated such flexibility, the opposition 
should be constructive in agreeing the motions (para.49). This found approval from the House on 
29 October 2002, but only as part of a broader package of reforms laid before the House.  
More recently, Peter Hain, as Leader of the House, has also had the Modernisation 
Committee re-examine programming (HC 1222, 2002-2003). The October 2003 Report made 
something of a veiled threat to critics, saying ‘it is important for all sides to recognise that 
programming is here to stay’ (para.28). In addition, the Report stressed that programming ‘is not 
simply a tool of Government’ but ‘is a set of procedures of the House and, as such, Members in 
all parts of the House bear responsibility for its efficient operation’ (para.28). The report’s 
recommendations focused on procedural improvements to the programming process. Again, there 
was a dissenting report, attached by Richard Shepherd, which criticised the way the government 
had abandoned voluntary timetabling in favour of government-driven programming. 
Moves towards structured legislative programming have clearly provoked highly critical 
views from MPs both inside the Modernisation Committee and in the House at large. At the start 
of the 1997 parliament, as the Hansard record demonstrates, there was general cross-party 
support for the principle of legislative programming. That consensus quickly evaporated. This is 
no doubt partly as a result of the volume of legislation the government was laying before the 
House (Blackburn & Kennon 2003:421). In addition, legislative programming has arguably not 
been accompanied by improvements in scrutiny mechanisms that will make the process more 
palatable for opposition and backbench MPs (Blackburn & Kennon 2003:426). However, the 
make-up of the Modernisation Committee has provided additional ammunition for those who 
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oppose legislative programming, and the way government has handled its introduction and 
development. Even those supportive Conservative members of the Committee have criticised 
programming. One such member even partly blamed the new 1997 Labour intake for the progress 
made on programming, and their adherence to the views of the Leader of the House. He argued 
that they ‘do not appreciate the role of opposition in democracy’ (interview, 23 May 2000). As a 
result, they were uncommonly keen to support modernisation by means of programming, which 
this MP believed to be ‘a euphemism for guillotining’ and which served ‘to limit the ability of 
opposition … to delay legislation, and, in some cases, to amend legislation’ (interview, 23 May 
2002).  
 
Parliamentary sitting hours 
As with legislative programming, the issue of House sitting hours is not a new one, and in recent 
times has been examined by the Jopling Committee (HC 20, 1991-1992), the Hansard Society 
Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny (Hansard Society 2001) and the Norton Commission 
(Norton 2000). Many contributions to the various Modernisation debates early in the 1997 
parliament focused on the parliamentary calendar and the times at which the Commons sits (e.g., 
HC Debs., 9 March 1998, vol.308, cols.17-18; 6 April 1998. vol.310, col.16). However, the 
Modernisation Committee’s first recommendations in this area were based, not on its own work, 
but on proposals put to it by government (HC 60, 1998-1999). These involved the House meeting 
for Questions at 11.30am with the moment of interruption coming at 7.00pm, and with Standing 
Committees meeting between 9.00am and 11.30am, and 4.30pm and 7.00pm. The Modernisation 
Committee decided to recommend these government proposals to the House, noting that if the 
House rejected them, the Committee would then recommend the implementation of an 
‘alternative scenario’.  
The proposed reforms to the Thursday sitting hours provoked considerable controversy 
when they were debated in the House on 16 December 1998, on a government motion. This was 
further complicated by an amendment tabled by Sir George Young. The Opposition view of the 
matter, put most coherently by Sir Peter Emery, was that without the amendment, there was no 
way to approve the alternative scenario, because that scenario would only be put to the vote if the 
government option fell. He further noted that, ‘[t]o anyone who believes … that we can vote 
down the first motion [the government option], I can only say, “Come into the real world”. The 
chances of defeating a government motion are negligible’ (HC Debs., 16 December 1998, 
vol.322, col.1020).  
Noting the considerable input of the government on this issue, and the decision of the 
Modernisation Committee to prioritise the government’s reform proposals, Committee member 
Nicholas Winterton said: 
 
Is not one of the problems facing the House the fact that this is a House of Commons 
matter, yet we are considering Government proposals?  … I am not sure that I believe 
that the Committee should be chaired by a member of the Government and Cabinet. 
That is the problem. We are debating Government proposals which the Government 
want to get through when it should be entirely a House of Commons matter; 
proposals should be put forward by the House of Commons through the 
Modernisation Committee. (cols.1000-1). 
 
The House first divided on the amendment to the government option, which it voted down 
by 311 votes to 140. After the division, Andrew Robathan made a point of order, which 
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illustrated the difficult partisan issues that had been mixed into the issue, as a result of the main 
motion being government sponsored: 
 
I had always understood that the business of the House of Commons was traditionally 
a matter for a free vote. Outside the Aye Lobby, there were no Whips, either Liberal 
or Conservative, but outside the No Lobby there were at least four Government 
Whips, encouraging others with no independence of mind into the Lobby. Is not that 
an abuse of the House? (col.1054) 
 
The Deputy Speaker indicated in reply that whips were free to go where they pleased (col.1054). 
What this particular debate demonstrated was, that although the issues under discussion were 
relatively simple questions regarding the nature of the parliamentary working week, the fact that 
the proposals were government-driven added an element of controversy into the proceedings. 
This further fuelled the disagreements outlined about the way in which the government proposals 
were to be voted on, and the apparent marginalisation of the alternative scenario outlined by the 
Modernisation Committee.  
The Committee recommended the continued use of the new Thursday hours in subsequent 
reports (HC 719, 1998-1999; HC 954, 1999-2000). Debate in the Commons illustrated continued 
disagreement over how the effects of these changes should be interpreted (HC Debs., 20 
November 2000, vol.357, cols.30-31). Gwyneth Dunwoody, for example, argued the changes 
meant Members had lost the right to vote on important matters on Fridays (cols.30-31). Eric 
Forth claimed that Members’ convenience, rather than effective parliamentary scrutiny, had 
become the primary concern of the Modernisation Committee: 
 
It [reform] is about the House of Commons being organised and run for the 
convenience of Members - not so that they can properly discharge their duties or 
make life difficult for the Government, and not to allow serious debate, but for the 
convenience of Members. (col.50) 
 
The September 2002 reform package published under Robin Cook also tackled these issues 
(HC 1168, 2001-2002), and objections continued to be heard. Cook even tried to pre-empt these 
criticisms, stating that ‘I have rejected the notion that there is some kind of conflict between 
Government and the House of Commons’ (HC Debs., 29 October 2002, vol.391, col.689). 
Shadow Leader Eric Forth questioned the extent to which the proposed changes would impact 
upon parliament’s relationship with the executive, casting doubt on ‘whether what the 
Government – thinly cloaked as the Modernisation Committee on this occasion – propose will 
make the House of Commons more effective in scrutinising the Government and holding them to 
account’ (col.706). Liberal Democrat Paul Tyler took issue with this characterisation of the 
Committee, arguing that, ‘[t]he media and Members of the House seem to treat the proposals as 
though they are Government proposals. They are the proposals of a Select Committee, just as the 
proposals of the Procedure Committee … are from an all-party Committee. It is important to 
recognise that’ (col.717-8). Forth asked Tyler to concede that: 
 
[t]he so-called Modernisation Committee, like all Committees of the House, has a 
large Government majority and that in this case – unusually and wrongly – it is 
chaired by a Member of the Government and, indeed, a Cabinet Minister? Does that 
not make the Committee rather different? (col.718) 
 9
Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association]
 
Labour’s Chris Mullin objected to the proposed changes, not because they would, as others like 
Eric Forth suggested, reduce the total number of sitting hours, but because ‘a parliamentary day 
does not consist only of what goes on in the Chamber’ (col.724). He described himself as a 
moderniser, ‘but not at any price’, and criticised the reduced quality of scrutiny that would result 
from the changes (col.723). Helen Jackson, Mullin’s PLP colleague and a Modernisation 
Committee member, attacked this view (col.724), demonstrating the intra-party discontent that 
had emerged. Mullin’s amendment to prevent some of the sitting hour changes was only 
narrowly defeated by 288 votes to 265. The motion for earlier sitting hours on Tuesdays was only 
just carried by 274 votes to 267.  
Much of the controversy over the sitting hours changes has stemmed from claims that these 
‘family friendly’ policies have been driven through thanks to the new Labour intake prompted by 
the government. One Conservative member of the All-Party Group for Parliamentary Reform, for 
example, described an ‘unholy alliance’ between the government and its New Labour intake of 
1997, which had effectively forced the changes onto the rest of the House (interview, 14 May 
2002). This MP was not opposed to improved hours of work for MPs, but less sure as to whether 
the various reforms had actually achieved such an improvement: 
 
I think there has been an unfortunate confusion between the very clear fact that our 
hours and our procedures are not in the current parliament family friendly – I think 
there’s been a confusion between a reasonable desire to try to change that, and some 
of the steps which have been taken … which actually don’t necessarily make 
parliament that much more family friendly, do make the hours shorter, and which 
certainly constrains the ability of parliament to do its job. (interview, 14 May 2002) 
 
Time-limited speeches 
The Modernisation Committee has examined a number of different changes to proceedings in the 
House, some being more controversial than others. The one that has arguably provoked the most 
criticism came under the chairmanship of Robin Cook, who has otherwise been commended for 
his consensus-seeking approach to modernisation (interviews, 23 April 2002, 14 May 2002, 15 
May 2002, 23 May 2002).  
That recommendation came in September 2002, and sought to impose a time-limit on 
backbench speeches during debates, but not frontbench speeches (HC 1168, 2001-2002; para.87-
89). This had previously found favour with the Norton Commission (Norton 2000). Peter Pike 
defended this recommendation on the grounds that filibustering was not a legitimate way to 
conduct legislative scrutiny (HC Debs., 29 October 2002, vol.391, cols.716-7), and Paul Tyler 
expressed similar views (col.722-3). Sir Patrick Cormack, however, outlined his opposition to the 
time-limiting of speeches, arguing that it removed the spontaneity of debate and rendered 
Members less likely to accept interventions (col.737). Sir Peter Tapsell argued that the ten-minute 
limit would ‘greatly increase the influence of the Executive and reduce the power of the 
Chamber’ (col.733). Tapsell referred to the Gettysburg Address and the Sermon on the Mount, 
noting that ‘although Abraham Lincoln and Jesus Christ could move the world in 10 minutes, 
most of us need a little longer’ (col.733). Gerald Kaufman outlined his concerns about the 
proposal in a similar fashion: 
 
Let us imagine it is 1938. Winston Churchill gets up: he inveighs against 
Chamberlain, he inveighs against appeasement, he inveighs against Hitler and he 
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inveighs against Mussolini. He says that we must be prepared for a second world war. 
While he is developing his argument, Mr. Deputy Speaker says, ‘Order. The right 
hon. Gentleman has come to the end of his 12 minutes.’ (col.740) 
 
 As the proposal to time-limit speeches came as part of a wider package of modernisation, it 
received House approval. Although there was clear criticism of the recommendation, a good deal 
of the debate was consumed by the proposals for legislative programming and sitting hours (as 
noted above). This, coupled with the time-limited recommendation coming as a part of a broader 
package, meant that criticism of the Modernisation Committee and the role of the Leader of the 
House accompanied criticisms of these other changes. 
 
Efficiency reforms and the House of Commons 
In its First Special Report (HC 865, 1998-1999), the Committee noted its programme of work 
had ‘produced a mixed response in the House’ (para.12).  In addition, while some MPs felt the 
process of reform had ‘gone far enough’ others felt reform had been ‘merely tinkering at the 
edges of the far more radical reforms needed’ (para.12). The Committee defended the work it had 
conducted, noting it had attempted ‘to reach consensus where possible, and to provide for 
experimental and evolutionary change rather than an enforced revolution’ (para.12).  
During Questions in the House in March 1999, Eric Forth asked about the progress of 
reforming the parliamentary calendar. His approach pinpoints the essential difficulties of the 
Modernisation Committee and its role: 
 
Given the President of the Council’s role as representative of the House of Commons 
within government, will she give an absolute guarantee that, whatever changes are 
proposed for consideration by the House under the rather dubious rubric of 
modernisation, the one thing that will not happen is a reduction of the time available 
to the House to scrutinise and hold to account the Government? (HC Debs., 1 March 
1999, vol.326, col.738) 
 
This comment, which is hardly unique in Hansard, illuminates two different points regarding the 
progress of efficiency reforms in the House. First, Forth’s point is partisan, as, of course, are 
most questions asked at Question Time. This partisanship is itself an obstacle to reform (Judge 
1983, Norton 1983). Second, Forth’s comment highlights that efficiency forms can be, and have 
been, used as mechanisms to prevent systematic executive scrutiny, because the government 
perceives improvements in Commons efficiency as opportunities to accelerate the progression of 
its own business. Forth’s comment pinpoints the particularly contentious nature of the 
chairmanship of the Modernisation Committee. The chairman is also a government minister in 
charge of the government’s business programme, and thus arguably more inclined to secure 
conditions which ease government business through the House than create conditions to impede 
it.  
There is no clear-cut distinction between efficiency and effectiveness – that much was 
made clear earlier. Many reforms in the interests of securing efficiency in the Commons, 
however they might be promoted, may also impact upon its effectiveness. Perhaps the clearest 
example is the carry-over of public bills (HC 543, 1997-1998). This is of benefit to the 
government, which avoids losing its legislation. It is also of benefit to the House of Commons, 
which avoids a glut of work at the start of the session because it is possible for bills to be 
introduced later as a result of the carry-over procedure.  
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Such an observation does not, however, alter the basic reasons why government engages in 
parliamentary reform. The ultimate reason is to create the most efficient procedures for passing 
government business through the House. While this statement may seem to sympathise with 
views put forward by many of the Conservatives who have spoken in the House on this theme, it 
is not intended as a value judgement. Instead, it is an assessment of the sensibilities of the 
dominant elite inside the Commons. Furthermore, the continued emphasis on efficiency, 
particularly legislative efficiency, is simply a result of the historical development of the House.  
Tony Wright emphasised this point when he noted that ‘we are engaging in some 
modernisation of the House, but the question is whether we are engaging in parliamentary 
reform’ (HC Debs., 9 November 2000, vol.356, col.510). Wright argued that, at the beginning of 
the 1997 parliament, ‘the Modernisation Committee did not take a view in the round on what 
parliamentary reform required’, the result being that ‘[w]e do not know to what purpose and in 
what direction we are modernising, and we are suffering greatly as a result’ (col.510). Sir Peter 
Emery expressed his views in the same debate when he said that the government’s ‘purpose in 
modernisation is to strengthen the Executive and override any major suggestion of allowing 
Parliament to have a greater impact on the Executive’ (col.513). 
This executive preference for securing its own self-interest is not new, and is a product of 
historical development and its place inside the legislature. Modernisation is not a by-word for 
parliamentary reform. Indeed, ‘[t]he government’s approach to legislative modernisation always 
owed more to its desire to secure the passage of its business than to a desire to improve the 
effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny’ (Cowley & Stuart, 2001:238). The path dependency of 
institutional development means that executives focus on ways to secure efficiency, largely 
surrounding various adaptations to the legislative process. For several decades of the twentieth 
century, for example, these path dependent adaptations focused on creating and then improving 
the standing committee system (Griffith 1977, Walkland 1979). More recently during the time of 
the Modernisation Committee, the adaptations have focused on legislative programming and 
enhancing governmental control over parliamentary time.  
Legislative programming, changes to sitting hours are not, in themselves, automatically 
beneficial to government. As noted, these reforms have been promoted by independent Hansard 
Society commissions (1993, 2001), and by the party-based Commission to Strengthen Parliament 
(Norton 2000a). They can, however, be adapted to be of most advantage to the government. 
Legislative programming processes, for example, can be dealt with on a cross-party basis in the 
House, or can be co-opted and dominated by government. These reforms have been made most 
beneficial to government on these occasions by means of a House committee, chaired by a 
government minister. It is this that has frequently been the flash-point for controversy and the 
cause of much complaint regarding the nature of Modernisation Committee reforms, not only on 
Conservative benches, but also on Labour backbenches. Despite early hopes to the contrary, the 
modernisation project has not been an area on which all Members can agree, not only on account 
of the nature of the modernisation proposals, but because the Modernisation Committee is itself a 
contested and controversial arena. Different Leaders of the House have certainly used the 
Committee in different ways. While it was seen to be particularly executive-driven under the 
leadership of Margaret Beckett, Robin Cook attempted a more conciliatory approach that aimed 
to reconcile executive and legislative interests (interviews, 23 April 2002, 15 May 2002, 23 May 
2002). The Conservatives have, however, consistently taken issue with a select committee of the 
House of Commons that is chaired by a government minister. That may not have interfered with 
the ability of the Committee (and the government) to secure efficiency reforms, but it has 
certainly impeded the opportunities for cross-party collaboration on modernisation.  
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The continued controversy over the recommendations emanating from the Modernisation 
Committee has been compounded by the decision of the Procedure Committee to conduct an 
investigation into the operation of legislative programming and the impact of the new sitting 
hours (Procedure Committee Press Notice, 11 December 2003). It is notable that the Procedure 
Committee is chaired by Nicholas Winterton, the restrained Conservative Modernisation member 
who has nevertheless questioned the role of Leader of the House in its chair. The sitting hours 
investigation may be seen as part of a more comprehensive House assessment of the utility of the 
previous changes. Current Leader of the House, Peter Hain, under pressure from his own 
backbenches, has already committed to a formal review coupled with extensive consultation with 
MPs. This includes ‘common sense alterations’ to be made without Modernisation Committee 
approval, on account of other business it is currently attending to (HC Debs., 8 January 2004, 
vol.416, col.403). If previous events are any guide to the future, it may well be that any 
immediate recommendations on sitting hours will be criticised as unilateral action on House 
matters taken by a cabinet minister interested in forwarding the agenda of government. 
The Procedure Committee investigation into legislative programming is a continuing 
reflection of the concern expressed in the House about the way in which it operates in practice, 
clearly illustrated in the frequent return of the Modernisation Committee to the issue. Nicholas 
Winterton has already made it clear that the principle of programming is not in question, and that 
the aim of the investigation is ‘to make it work better so that legislation is properly scrutinised 
and so that the House does the job which it is here to do’ (HC 325-ii, uncorrected oral evidence 
from 25 February 2004). In that respect, the central questions asked by the Procedure Committee 
are: how can a consensus be built on the need to make programming really work, and are 
procedural changes simply ‘tinkering at the edges of this problem?’ (HC 325-ii, uncorrected oral 
evidence). Sir Alan Haselhurst, Chairman of Ways and Means, has stated in his evidence to the 
Procedure Committee that, ‘you can devise any kinds of procedural modifications, you can go for 
a grand design such as a Business Committee as has been proposed in the past, but unless there is 
a degree of willingness and co-operation amongst the various parties then I do not think you are 
going to get satisfactory treatment of Bills’ (HC 325-ii, uncorrected oral evidence).  
Any changes proposed by the Procedure Committee must also find a point of consensus 
between the rather different views on the legislative process, and the attendant roles of 
government and opposition therein, outlined by Eric Forth and Barbara Follett in evidence on 10 
March 2004 (HC 325-iii, uncorrected oral evidence). Eric Forth’s view on the matter, and the 
way forward for programming, is that: 
 
I think everything in this rests on the assumptions that one makes about the relative 
roles of government and opposition in the legislative process and particularly in 
standing committees. If one assumes, as I do, that in our system of parliamentary 
government where the government has, by definition, a majority and where it is the 
government's legislative programme that is being scrutinised by parliament, I believe 
it is of the utmost importance for the effectiveness of that process that it is the 
opposition which essentially has the dominant hand in determining how much time 
will be spent in committee. (HC 325-iii, uncorrected oral evidence) 
 
Barbara Follett’s view, on the other hand, is that a more efficient method must be found for 
securing legislation and to prevent the excessive time often spent in standing committee on 
irrelevancies and filibustering (HC 325-iii, uncorrected oral evidence). The Procedure 
Committee’s ultimate recommendations in this area, therefore, will presumably attempt to secure 
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the cross-party co-operation that the Modernisation Committee has failed to establish in its own 
legislative programming packages, and to steer a path between the competing views of the 
purpose of the legislative process. While the nature of future proposals is unclear, it will be 
interesting to observe how they are received by the House, emerging as they will from a 
committee that does not bear the hallmarks of government in the way critics have claimed the 
Modernisation Committee has done. 
 
Conclusion 
The Modernisation Committee has been a rather strange parliamentary creature. It has failed to 
secure the kind of support from the House that other select committees have, partly because of 
the ease with which its chairmanship has been examined and found wanting. It has certainly paid 
most attention to those issues that are of particular interest to government, with legislative 
programming being the clear example. Other committees and Commissions have examined 
legislative programming and similar issues, and have made numerous recommendations that 
have attracted broad support. However, the role of the Leader of the House, as a cabinet minister, 
in the chair of the Modernisation Committee, has made it infinitely easier for critics of all 
persuasions to attack the merits of its recommendations, whether ‘justified’ or not. The purpose 
of having the Leader of the House in the Modernisation Committee chair is disputed. It may 
indeed have been to ensure that its recommendations came with the blessing of government, and 
so secure reform more speedily. However, it has not embarked on a great deal of radical reform 
that needs government acquiescence, and even when it has, the reform endeavour partially failed 
(see Kelso 2003). If the idea was to use the Leader of the House to push ahead with 
modernisation (as opposed to reform) and secure cross-party support, it has backfired. The nature 
of the occupancy of the Modernisation Committee chair has served as a useful stick with which 
to beat the modernisation project. The forthcoming recommendations of the Procedure 
Committee on legislative programming and sitting hours will serve as a litmus test of the future 
legitimacy of the Modernisation Committee and its unusual chairmanship. 
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